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Abstract: Dynastic marriages in the Hellenistic world were an important diplomatic tool that pro-
vided distinct political benefi ts to one or both of the parties involved. The Parthian rulers from the 
Arsacid dynasty also engaged in such unions with other ruling houses. Surviving sources contain 
information on such marriages with the members of the Seleucid family, the Artaxiad dynasty, 
which ruled in Armenia, but also ruling houses in Commagene and Media Atropatene. Not all of
these links resulted from a bilateral agreement, however; some were the result of imposition of the 
Arsacids’ will. The author attempts to demonstrate the circumstances in which each of the known 
dynastic marriages of the rulers of Parthia came about, as well as the objectives they hoped to 
achieve as a result.
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Among the characteristic political phenomena of the Hellenistic period were marriages 
between members of the ruling dynasties.1 In the world as it was at the time, divided into 
many states, these marriages were treated as an important political tool. They allowed 
particular rulers to strengthen their political position both in their own state and else-
where. Adept arrangement of dynastic marriages was generally benefi cial for both sides, 
enabling them to acquire coalition partners, contributing to the solution of long-lasting 
confl icts with neighbours over disputed territories, and allowing at least one of the par-
ties to broaden its sphere of infl uence. However, the status of the two parties was not 
always equal, and as a result, the stronger partner would often break the union unilater-
ally if it deemed it not to be benefi cial in a specifi c political situation. The dominance of 
one of the sides could also lead it to interfere in the internal affairs of its partner in order 
to force it to act in a conducive way, or to achieve specifi c goals. A separate issue is the 
cases of the dynastic marriages which took place not on the basis of a mutual agreement, 
but coercion. A further signifi cant element of the unions between specifi c ruling houses 
was the circumstances that forming them not only justifi ed, but even rendered essential. 
Owing to the diversity and the sheer number of these situations, each Hellenistic dynas-
tic marriage must be assessed separately, bearing in mind the participating parties, the 
1 Cf. Seibert 1967. Many studies of this phenomenon were published by R.D. Sullivan (1978a, b, c).
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motives that lay behind it, the circumstances in which it occurred and the objectives it 
was to serve. By no means should the importance of these factors be underestimated, as 
they are the key to grasping the essence and shape of the political and cultural relations 
between the various Hellenistic rulers, as well as their consequences.
There is no doubt that the Arsacid dynasty that ruled the Parthian state, in spite of 
its Iranian origins, should be treated as belonging to the Hellenistic world. Although the 
Arsacids distinctly emphasised their Iranian identity, this did not stop them from making 
use of Hellenistic models in the sphere of culture, politics and ideology, as well as propa-
gating a Philhellene stance towards their Hellenised subjects. The problem is that it is not 
always clear what the relations of the Parthian rulers with their Hellenistic neighbours 
looked like. Our knowledge on this subject is full of blanks. The reason for this is above 
all the paucity of narrative sources – both Greek (despite the extensive Greek historiog-
raphy of the Hellenistic period, little has survived) and Parthian. Those that we do have 
only provide a limited insight into the Arsacids’ relations with the Seleucids, Bactria, 
the nomads in Central Asia, Armenia, Media Atropatene, Characene and Elymais. We 
should also note that our information on these relations is mainly confi ned to episodes 
involving mutual armed confl icts. The sources do also contain information that allows us 
to look at the Arsacids’ relations with the rulers of other states from a slightly different 
perspective – that of the dynastic marriages they entered into. These marriages are an 
important piece of evidence that shine some light on the objectives and directions of the 
rulers of Parthia’s foreign policy and operating methods.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to obtain a complete picture of the matrimonial alli-
ances of the Arsacids, both because of the low number of sources on the marriages they 
formed and as a result of the lack of full information on the genealogy of the Parthian 
ruling house.2 As a rule, we do not know the names of the majority of the wives of the 
Parthian kings, just as we are able to say almost nothing, or only little, on the rulers them-
selves or their origins.3 We know even less about the individual kings’ families. Apart 
from a few exceptions, the names of both their sons and their daughters are unknown, not 
to speak of which royal bride was their mother.
a) Dynastic marriages of the Arsacids with the Seleucids
The earliest mentions of the Arsacids showing interest in unions with other dynasties 
can be found in a description of the campaign by the king of Syria, Demetrius II Nicator, 
against the Parthians in 139–138 BCE.4 Its objective was to liberate Media and Meso-
potamia, conquered by Mithridates I (165–131 BCE), from Parthian rule. He probably 
2 See Sullivan 1978c, stemma Parthia, between p. 938–938; Assar 2004; 2005.
3 See Huber – Hartmann 2006; Bigwood 2008; Strugnell 2008.
4 Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –140A, ‘Rev., ll. 7’–9’; cf. also Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –141F, ‘Rev., 
l. 26’; no. 140A, Obv.’, l. 1; 1 Macc 14: 1–3; Josephus, AJ 13.186; Just. 36.1.2–4; Euseb., Chron., p. 120, 
16–21 [ed. Karst] (= Porphyry, FGrH 260, F 32.16 = PNJ 260, F 32); Oros. 5.4.16; cf. App., Syr. 67. See 
Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 365–366; Will 1982, 407–408, 409; Dąbrowa 1992, 46–48 (cf. Dąbrowa 2011, 
16–19); 1999, 9–16 (= Dąbrowa 2011, 49–57); Mittag 2002, 373–374; Shayegan 2003, 84–87; Ehling 1998a, 
227–229; 2008, 184–186. 
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captured the fi rst of these lands shortly after 148 BCE,5 and the second a few years later, 
in 141 BCE.6 We know that Demetrius II and his army invaded Babylonian territory.7 Ini-
tially enjoying a series of successes, his excessive confi dence in his own talents and the 
errors he made ultimately resulted in the failure of his campaign: the army was crushed, 
and he and his retinue were enslaved.8 Mithridates I used the captured Demetrius II to pla-
cate the hostile moods among the Greek residents of Media and Mesopotamia. By show-
ing the royal prisoner to the residents of the cities of these lands, he hoped to encourage 
them to become reconciled with Parthian rule.9 When this humiliating journey for the 
king of Syria came to an end, his position improved markedly. Mithridates I placed him 
in one of his palaces in Hyrcania and gave him his own daughter, Rhodogune, in mar-
riage.10 The union was accompanied by Mithridates I’s promise to restore the Seleucid 
throne to Demetrius II in future.11
The news that reached Demetrius II of the struggle between the pretenders to the 
throne going on in Syria led him to attempt to fl ee. Yet he was unsuccessful. Caught 
in fl ight, he was sent back to Hyrcania, where he remained under the tightened super-
vision imposed after Mithridates I’s death by his successor, and Rhodogune’s brother, 
Phraates II. He survived the next few years in captivity, and his attitude at this time, ac-
cording to the Parthian community, suggested that he was resigned to his fate. In fact, 
he did not give up the intention to return to his homeland. A few years later, he made 
a renewed attempt to escape, but this too was unsuccessful, and he was again sent back to 
Hyrcania. Phraates II treated the fugitive leniently. Yet the Parthian king’s position was 
not the result of magnanimity, but political calculation. According to Justin, he intended 
to use Demetrius II to rule over Syria.12 Phraates II planned to pitch him against his 
brother, Antiochus VII Sidetes, whose aggressive policy with the aim of rebuilding the
might of the Seleucids aroused his concern. Antiochus VII was also well aware of
the effects of any involvement of the Parthians in Syrian affairs, and, wishing to forestall 
any Parthian interference in 130 BCE,13 embarked on a campaign against Phraates II.14 
5 Cf. Just. 41.6.7; Le Rider 1965, 339–345.
6 Cf. Will 1982, 408.
7 Although some ancient authors suggest that the campaign was played out in Media (1 Macc 14:1), the 
references surviving in cuneiform sources (cf. Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –137A, ‘Rev.’, ll. 8’–11’) indicate 
that it was in fact confi ned to the area of Mesopotamia: Shayegan 2003, 86–87.
8 1 Macc 14: 3; Pomp. Trogus, prol. 38; Athen., Deipn. 4.153a (= Poseidonios, FGrH 87, F 32 = Edelstein 
– Kidd 1989, frg. 64 = BNJ 87, F 12); Just. 36.1.5; 38.9.2; 39.1.1–2; App., Syr. 67.
9 Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –137A, ‘Rev.’, ll. 10’–11’ (cf. Del Monte 1997, 110–111); Just. 36.1.5.
10 Just. 36.1.6; 38.9; App., Syr. 67–68.
11 Just. 38.9.3.
12 Just. 38.9.10; Nabel 2017, 32. Regarding Justin and his interpretation, cf. Mittag 2002, 377–389.
13 Information contained in cuneiform documents (Shayegan 2003, 90–91) justifi es the assumption that 
the beginning of Antiochus VII’s expedition took place in 130 BCE, and not 131 BCE, as was widely assumed 
based on the sources of Greek and Latin authors; cf. Fischer 1970, 35–48.
14 Diodorus 34/35.15–17; Jos. AJ 13.250–253; Just. 38.10.1–6; App. Syr. 68; Euseb., Chron., p. 120, 33–
121, 18 [ed. Karst] (= Porphyry, FGrH 260, F 32.19–20 = BNJ 260, F 32). According to Diodorus (34/35.15), 
Antiochus VII demanded that Phraates II give up Demetrius II, return all the territories conquered by the Parthians 
at the expense of the Seleucids, and pay the outstanding tribute. For more on the subject of the expedition, see 
Fischer 1970; Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 379–384; Will 1982, 413–415; Dąbrowa 1992, 48–50 (cf. Dąbrowa 2011, 
19–20); Ehling 1998b, 141–142; Shayegan 2003, 90–92; Ehling 2008, 200–205.
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Similarly to the case of Demetrius II’s earlier expedition, the beginning of the campaign 
was successful for the Syrian king, as he gained a signifi cant advantage over his rival. 
Among the results of this was the withdrawal of certain vassal rulers from the Parthians. 
Finding himself in an unfavourable position, Phraates II decided to undertake diversion-
ary actions in Syria, hoping to force Antiochus VII to turn back. He entrusted Dem-
etrius II with their realisation, surrendering a corps of his own men to his leadership.15 
Antiochus VII’s excessive confi dence, and the numerous mistakes he made in military 
art, resulted in loss of support of the local population in the captured territories, as they 
turned against him. The changing moods of the population enabled the king of Parthia 
to crush the Syrian forces.16 In one of the fi nal battles that decided upon the fate of the 
expedition, Antiochus VII was killed.17 The rapid end to the war meant that the diver-
sionary operation in Syria no longer made sense, and Phraates II decided to cancel it. 
He no doubt realised that in this situation Demetrius II’s actions could bring him more 
problems than advantages. These concerns proved to be grounded. Before Phraates II’s 
envoys could reach Demetrius II, he had already managed to cross the border of Syria. 
As soon as he arrived in his homeland, he set about fi ghting to regain the throne lost 
years before.18 As a result, the Parthian ruler’s political plans, which had been tied to 
him, went up in smoke.19
Even if this was the case, Phraates II soon found a solution that could potentially 
assure him considerable political capital in the future. In the conquered camp of Antio-
chus VII, he found other members of the Seleucid family who had accompanied him in 
the campaign, including Laodice, the daughter of Demetrius II.20 For the Parthian king, 
this was a very valuable capture, as he could use her in operations against her father. 
Laodice’s charms apparently soon led the king of Parthia to marry her.21 It is hard to say 
for sure whether this union was dictated solely by the feelings (as Justin suggests) that 
the ruler ignited, or rather by political calculation. The version with the passionate feel-
ings by no means precludes the other eventuality. In a situation in which Demetrius II 
had escaped the clutches of Phraates II, the marriage to Laodice gave him the chance to 
get involved in Syrian affairs under the pretext of defending his wife’s interests. In fact, 
he had several more such pretexts: they also included protecting the rights of the chil-
dren of Demetrius II, born from his relationship with Rhodogune, to the Syrian throne, 
15 Just. 38.10.7; App. Syr. 68.
16 Pomp. Trogus, prol. 38; Diodorus 34/35.16; 17.2; Just. 38.10.8–10.
17 Pomp. Trogus, prol. 39; Just. 38.10.9; 39.1.1; Jos. AJ 13.253. According to Appian (Syr. 68), 
Antiochus VII committed suicide.
18 Pomp. Trogus, prol. 39; Just. 38.10.11; 39.1.1; Jos. AJ 13.253; Ehling 1998b, 144–147; 2008, 205–
212; Nabel 2017, 32.
19 Cf. Diodorus 34/35.18. R.R. Shayegan’s claim (2003, 92–96) that Demetrius II, after reclaiming power 
in Syria, was a tool in the hands of Phraates II, though attractive, is also speculative, as it is based on rather 
uncertain information. Some scholars believe that the Parthian bondage contributed to Demetrius II taking on 
some of the customs of the Arsacid court, giving as evidence the iconography of the coins he minted during 
the second period of his rule; cf. Ehling 1998b, 142–144; 2008, 205–208. However, not everyone shares this 
view; cf. Mittag 2002, 389–399. 
20 Just. 38.10.10; cf. Huber – Hartmann 2006, 500.
21 According to Justin (28.10.10), the marriage took place soon after the death of Antiochus VII: cui 
Phrahates exequias regio more fecie fi liamque Demetrii, quam secum Antiochus adduxerat, raptus amore 
virginis uxorem duxit.
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or potentially making use of another member of the Syrian ruling family, who was also 
supposedly in his hands.22
It is unclear whether Phraates II or his successors, at any point and in any way, ex-
ploited the aforementioned dynastic marriages with the members of the Seleucid family 
or their progeny to interfere in the affairs of Syria. Given the paucity of historical sources 
available, however, this possibility certainly cannot be ruled out. The sources also fail 
to mention any of the later rulers of Parthia forming any further dynastic union with the 
Seleucids.
b) Dynastic marriages of the Arsacids with the Artaxiads
Information on dynastic marriages between the Arsacids and the Artaxiad dynasty that 
ruled over Armenia dates from several decades later. One of the parchment documents 
found in Avroman23 issued during the reign of a Parthian ruler named Mithridates,24 and 
dated to 87 BCE, also mentions his wives.25 One of them, named Aryzate, also known 
as Automa, is notable, as the document makes it clear that she was the daughter of the 
king of Armena, Tigranes II the Great.26 His presence at the side of the king of Parthia 
clearly suggests close links between the two dynasties. These date to the times of the 
rule of Mithridates II (c. 121–91), who in around 111/110 was successful, after several 
attempts, in subordinating the ruler of Armenia, Artavasdes I (121–96 BCE), uncle 
22 Certain scholars, citing references in the works of Athenaeus (Deipn. 4.153a), which he took from 
Poseidonios (FGrH 87 F 32 = Edelstein – Kidd 1989, frg. 64) and Eusebius (Chron., p. 121, 5–8 [ed. Karst] = 
Porphyry, FGrH 260, F 32.20 = BNJ 260, F 32), argue that the son of Demetrius II, Seleucus (V), fell into the 
hands of Phraates II (Bouché-Leclercq 1913, 383–384; 1914, 599–600; cf. this identifi cation was questioned 
by Thomas Fischer (1970, 49–54)), while others believe that it was also Antiochus VII, with the same name 
(cf. Nabel 2017, 27 (tab. 2.1), 32). In fact, the Seleucus and his fortunes mentioned in the cited fragments 
correspond to those experienced by Demetrius II after the lost war, and it is therefore with him that we should 
identify the Seleucus mentioned in these sources (cf. K. Dowden, commentary ad Poseidonios, BNJ 87 F 12). 
The arguments in favour of this view: Edelstein – Kidd 1988, 303–304; cf. Shayegan 2003, 95. There is no 
lack of suggestions that this Seleucus was in fact the son of Antiochus VII (Shayegan 2003, 95–96). Yet the 
arguments upon which this identifi cation is based are too tenuous to be acknowledged as likely.
23 See Minns 1915, 22–65; Luther 2018, 155–156.
24 Until recently, this ruler was generally identifi ed as Mithridates II, as Gotarzes I or Orodes I, see Luther 
2018, 157–159. Based on cuneiform and numismatic sources, we know that he died in 91 BCE: Sachs – 
Hunger 1996, no. –90, ‘Obv., l. 31’; Del Monte 1997, 169–170; Assar 2006a, 146–147; 2006b, 52. The ruler 
mentioned in the document from Avroman is therefore his son, Mithridates III (87–80 BCE), cf. Assar 2005, 
67–75. This identifi cation explains why the content of the document contains a description of Tigranes II as 
‘Basileus Megas’. Recently a new hypothesis based on argument that the Avroman documents were dated not 
according to the Seleucid era, but to the Arsacid era. Consequence of it is that the mentioned king Mithridates 
is in fact Mithridates VI, and the king Tigranes is identifi ed with Tigranes the Younger: Luther 2018, 160–170. 
In this paper the author follows the generally accepted dating.
25 Minns 1915, 28: Doc. Ia, ll. 1–5; Hackl – Jacobs – Weber 2010, II: 467, no. 1, ll. 1–5. 
26 Minns 1915, 28: Doc. Ia, ll. 3–5; Hackl – Jacobs – Weber 2010, II: 467, no. 1, ll. 3–4: καὶ γυναικὸς 
καὶ Ἀρυζάτης τῆς ἐπικαλουμένη[ς] Αὐτομὰ τῆς ἐγ βασιλέως μεγάλου Τιγράνου …; cf. Chaumont 1985/1988, 
21–23; Sullivan 1978c, 911, 913–914; Huber – Hartmann 2006, 501.
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of Tigranes II,27 and who maintained his infl uence in Armenia for the next two dec-
ades.28 The stability of these infl uences assured him a presence in the court as Tigranes’ 
hostage.29 He stayed there right up until 96/95 BCE. Then, after his uncle’s death, 
and with the consent of Mithridates II, Tigranes assumed the throne of Armenia.30 
We can assume that the marriage of the son of the Parthian monarch, Mithridates II, 
with the daughter of Tigranes took place shortly before he left the Parthian capital. 
Mithridates II presumably treated her as a guarantee of the loyalty of the new ruler of 
Armenia.31 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that until his father-in-law’s death, 
his relations with the Parthian state were in order. They changed signifi cantly only in 
the time of Mithridates II’s successors, when Tigranes exploited the disputes between 
pretenders to the Arsacid throne to launch an offensive policy towards his neighbour, 
whose power had forced him to spend many years in a submissive position. This new 
policy resulted in the territory of his own country increasing in size, with the lands that 
Mithridates II had torn away from Armenia being restored.32
The next dynastic marriage that we know of between the Arsacids and the Artaxiads 
took place several decades later. The parties involved were the unnamed daughter of 
Phraates III and Tigranes the Younger, son of Tigranes II the Great (95–55 BCE), who 
married in rather unusual circumstances.
In 66 BCE, Pompey assumed command in the war against Mithridates VI and his 
ally Tigranes II the Great. Important for the success of his military plans was the attitude 
of the then king of Parthia, Phraates III. If he were to back the coalitionists, this could 
cause Pompey a number of problems, which he therefore tried to prevent. The Roman 
leader’s fears were not unfounded, since both kings he was fi ghting against had previ-
ously attempted to secure support in the war with Rome of Phraates III’s predecessor, 
Sinatruces.33 On the fi rst occasion, around 72 BCE, this had been done by Mithridates VI 
Eupator,34 and several years later (c. 69/68), he renewed his request together with Ti-
granes.35 In return for his support, however, Sinatruces demanded the return of lands 
that Tigranes II had seized several years earlier at the cost of the Arsacid empire. His 
demand was refused, and the increase in size of the coalition therefore ultimately did not 
take place. This situation was exploited by Lucullus, who was then in command in the 
27 There are certain contradictions in the source information on the nature of the family relations between 
Tigranes II and his predecessor. The main subject of debate among scholars is who his predecessor was – his 
uncle, Artavasdes I, or his father, Tigranes I (App. Syr. 48); see Del Monte 1997, 166–167; Assar 2006a, 142, 
note 172; Geller – Traina 2013, 448; Kovacs 2016, 11–12. Cf. Chaumont 1985/1988, 17–19.
28 Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –110, ‘Rev.’, l. 14’ (cf. Del Monte 1997, 166); Pomp. Trogus, prol. 42; 
Just. 42.4.1. See Wolski 1980, 255–260; Chaumont 1985/1988, 13–17; Geller – Traina 2013, 448–450; 
Dąbrowa 2015, 291–292.
29 Strabo 11.14.15 (C 532); Geller – Traina 2013, 450.
30 Sachs – Hunger 1996, no. –95A, ll. 9’–12’; no. –95C, ‘Obv.’, ll. 5’–7’; no. –95D, ‘Flake’, l. 11’ (cf. Del 
Monte 1997, 165–166); Strabo 11.14.15 (C 532); Just. 38.3.1; Geller – Traina 2013, 450–452.
31 Cf. Chaumont 1985/1988, 22.
32 Cf. Strabo 11.14.15 (C 532); Just. 38.3.1. For the problems with identifying some of these territories, 
see Minns 1915, 41–42; Wolski 1980, 260; Dąbrowa 1983, 18–19; Chaumont 1985/1988, 23–25; Geller – 
Traina 2013, 451.
33 Memnon, FGrH F 22.4.
34 Memnon, FGrH F 29.6.
35 Plut. Luc. 30.1; App. Mithr. 87; Dio 36.1.1–2.3.
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war in the East. He began talks with Sinatruces, in order to distract him from the ongo-
ing confl ict for as long as possible.36 Although these talks did not lead to an agreement, 
fortunately for Lucullus, Sinatruces remained neutral. Pompey found himself in the same 
situation as Lucullus just before leaving the position of commander, with the difference 
that his partner on the Parthian side was Phraates III. But whereas Lucullus wanted to 
deceive Sinatruces with discussions not containing concrete proposals, Pompey treated 
Phraates II much more seriously, proposing a friendship treaty and Roman assent for his 
capture of the regions of northern Mesopotamia lost to Armenia. Attractive as this offer 
was, for reasons unclear to us, the king of Parthia delayed his response. This was prob-
ably because he did not intend to become only a passive observer of the events playing 
out close to the borders of his state, but he also wished to avoid provoking the Roman 
commander into hostile actions by giving away his true intentions too early. Another 
reason for his slow response to the Roman proposals might have been a much more at-
tractive prospect that opened up to him. As a result, he could gain much more than what 
the Roman commander was offering him.37
Tigranes the Younger was one of three sons of the ruler of Armenia, the two others 
having been killed by their father as a result of his fears of losing power.38 Although 
Tigranes the Younger was appointed his heir, confl ict ensued between father and son, 
which then led to civil war. Defeated by his father, the son took refuge in the court of 
Phraates III. The Parthian king agreed to help him in exchange for marrying his daugh-
ter.39 This marriage handed Phraates III the opportunity for involvement in the affairs of 
Armenia, whose ruler became an awkward neighbour for him, as well as the chance to 
engineer a situation to hamper Pompey’s activities that endangered Parthian interests.40 
Based on the context of the events, we can date the marriage of Tigranes the Younger to 
the daughter of Phraates III to around 66/65 BCE.
Phraates III took his commitments towards his son-in-law seriously, providing him 
with military support in operations in Armenia, and even involving himself personally 
until the moment when the campaign, after its fi rst successes, lost its impetus as a result 
of the need to capture the fortresses defended by garrison loyal to Tigranes II. At this 
time, Phraates III abandoned his son-in-law, but provided him with the use of some 
Parthian units. The next phase of fi ghting was no longer so successful for Tigranes the 
Younger. Unable to defeat his father, he fought at the side of Pompey, hoping in this way 
to gain the crown from the Romans.41 Yet he was not successful in this objective. When 
Tigranes II surrendered to Pompey and retained power, Tigranes the Younger, disap-
pointed at Pompey’s position, provoked a confl ict which would dash all his political 
hopes. He was imprisoned, and then sent to Rome.42 Although Phraates III intervened to 
Pompey with regard to freeing him, and demanded that the Euphrates be recognised as 
36 According to Memnon (FGrH F 38.8), Tigranes II did not approach the Parthian king with a request for 
joint action, but did demand the return of Mesopotamia, Adiabene and the Great Valleys.
37 See Debevoise 1938, 70–75; Dąbrowa 1983, 24–26.
38 Appian, Mithr. 104.
39 Plut. Pomp. 33.6; Appian, Mithr. 104; Dio Cassius 36.51.1; 37.6.4.
40 Cf. Appian, Mithr. 105.
41 Plut. Pomp. 33.1–2.
42 Plut. Pomp. 33.1–6; Appian, Mithr. 104–105; Dio Cassius 36.51.1–53.6.
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the Roman-Parthian border, little came from his efforts. At the point when the outcome 
of the war in Armenia was clear, after Tigranes II had surrendered to Pompey in 65 BCE, 
the Roman commander had nothing to fear from Phraates III, and moreover, made it 
clear that he was even prepared for a military confrontation with him.43
It appears that the failure of Phraates III’s Armenian plans did not persuade the Arsac-
ids to change their approach towards Armenia. They again set about strengthening their 
infl uences there, probably after the death of Tigranes II, when Artavasdes II (55–34 BCE) 
ascended the throne. Mutual relations between Orodes II, the ruler of Parthia, and Ar-
tavasdes II, became closer shortly after the latter came to power, infl uenced by news of 
the war against the Parthians planned by M. Licinius Crassus. The prospect of Roman 
aggression led Orodes II to seek support from the ruler of Armenia. The agreement be-
tween the two monarchs was founded on Artavasdes’ daughter’s marriage to Pacorus, 
son of Orodes II.44 The connection between these events is demonstrated by the fact that 
the marriage took place during the expedition of the Roman commander. According to 
Plutarch, Crassus’ head was handed to Orodes during a play performed in honour of the 
wedding ceremony.45
This marriage is the last known example of dynastic unions between the Arsacids and 
the Artaxiads. 
c) Dynastic marriages of the Arsacids with other ruling houses
Apart from marriages with members of the Seleucid and Artaxiad dynasties, the Arsacids 
also entered into unions with the ruling houses of other neighbouring states. References 
have survived which indicate that they allied themselves with the rulers of Commagene 
and Media Atropatene. In the former case, the mutual close relations were cemented 
by Orodes II’s marriage to Laodice, daughter of Antiochus I Theos, king of Comma-
gene.46 Similarly to the aforementioned marriage of Pacorus to the daughter of Artavas-
des II, this too took place as part of an alliance in response to the aggression of Crassus.
The matrimonial activity of the Parthian king shows that he treated familial relations 
with the kings of Armenia and Commagene as components of the coalition he had con-
structed against the Roman aggressor. In his son-in-law’s hour of need, however, the 
ruler of Commagene was reluctant to come to his aid in fi ghting not only Crassus, but 
also other Roman commanders.47 Yet Antiochus I’s cautious approach did not lead to 
a worsening in his relations with Orodes II. The numerous alliances between the king of 
Commagene and other dynasties meant that marriage to his daughter brought the Parthi-
an king into an extensive network of links between many dynasties. However, Laodice’s 
excellent connections became the cause of a family drama in the Parthian court. Fearing 
43 Plut. Pomp. 33.6; Dio Cassius 37.5.2–6. 
44 Plut. Crass. 33.1.
45 Plut. Crass. 33.2–4; Debevoise 1938, 92–93.
46 SEG 33, 1215, ll. 3–5: … τὸ ἄγαλμα εἶς ἄφθα[ρτ]ον μνήμην βασσιλίσσης Λαοδίκης, βασιλέ[ως ἀ]
δελφῆς καὶ βασιλέως βασιλέων Ὀρώδ[ου γυν]αικός …; Dio Cassius 49.23.4; Huber – Hartmann 2006, 502 
and note 60.
47 Cf. Sullivan 1978b, 766–770. 
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for his position, Phraates IV, the son and heir to Orodes II, murdered his stepbrothers – 
Laodice’s sons – partly because their lineage was superior to his own.48
All we know about the dynastic connections with the Atropatids, the ruling house 
in Media Atropatene, is that they took place. The rather vague mention by Strabo does 
not contain any names either of the rulers of Media Atropatene or of the Parthians dur-
ing whose rule marriages between the members of the two dynasties occurred. From its 
context, however, we can conclude that there may even have been a few such marriages 
over time.49 It was by no means by chance that the Arsacids showed interest in familial 
relations with the kings of the somewhat distant Media Atropatene. As a result of its 
location between Armenia and Parthia and the military potential it possessed, its rulers 
were a desirable ally for the Arsacids.50
The dynastic marriages of the Arsacids mentioned above include only those which, 
for various reasons, are referred to in sources. Given the fact that the individual rulers 
of the dynasty indicated their interest through this form of connections with other ruling 
houses, and that many of them possessed several wives each and numerous offspring, 
we can assume that the actual list of dynastic marriages entered into by the Arsacids was 
much longer. Any digressions on this topic are pure conjecture, however.
There is no doubt that all the dynastic marriages that we know of resulted from the 
parties’ pursuit of either short-term or long-term political objectives. As a result of these 
unions, acting as a seal on political deals, they hoped to gain the ability to affect their 
partner’s internal affairs, obtain their support in defence against common threats, or 
bring them closer. Examples of such strategies are both the relations of the Artaxiad dy-
nasty, which reigned Armenia, and the Atropatids, in Media Atropatene. Their marriages 
to the Seleucids were different. These permitted the Parthian kings to exert infl uence on 
the internal policy of the rulers of Syria by interfering in dynastic confl icts. As a result, 
they were able to force them to soften their aggressive policy towards the Parthian em-
pire. As far as we can ascertain, they managed this only to a limited extent. Perhaps the 
ineffectiveness of this tool led the Arsacids to cease using it. However, a more likely 
explanation for their failure to resume attempts to enter into dynastic marriages with the 
Seleucids after the rule of Mithridates I and Phraates II was the weakness of the latter. 
Owing to continuing confl icts over the throne among the numerous pretenders, plunging 
Syria into ever greater political chaos, the Seleucids no longer represented such a threat 
to the Arsacids for matrimonial unions to be required to blunt it.
The sources suggest that the majority of dynastic marriages were the result of agree-
ments between the respective parties. These certainly included the unions of the Arsacids 
with the ruling houses of Armenia, Media Atropatene and Commagene. In the case of 
marriages with the members of the Seleucid dynasty, the situation was completely differ-
ent – these occurred not as a result of bilateral agreement, but in conditions of coercion. 
Yet there is no doubt that these marriages were dynastic in nature. For the Arsacids, 
these unions could potentially be equally useful as marital agreements with other ruling 
houses, since they made it possible to blackmail the Seleucids with the threat of direct 
interference in their internal affairs.
48 Plut. Crass. 33.5; Just. 42.4.14–43.5.1; Dio Cassius 49.23.3–5.
49 Strabo 11.13.1 (C 523). Cf. Sullivan 1978c, 918; Huber – Hartmann 2006, 502 and note 61.
50 Cf. Strabo 11.13.1–4 (C 523–524). 
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Each of the dynastic marriages which the Arsacids entered into of course had its own 
individual characteristics determined by the circumstances and the time. But there is also 
no doubt that the Arsacids treated all these unions pragmatically, as a tool for realising 
both the short-term and the more far-reaching objectives of their imperial policy, mostly 
in the context of actions undertaken to protect the western boundaries of their state from 
the aggression of the Seleucids and Rome. We can assume with a large amount of cer-
tainty that they also acted similarly to guarantee their interests along the eastern and 
northern sections of their empire’s borders.51
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